International Law and Courts

(2020) "Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations."International Studies Quarterly 64(4): 785–797.

 

Authors: Kelebogile Zvobgo, Wayne Sandholtz, and Suzie Mulesky

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• 2019 Best Paper Award, Human Rights Section, American Political Science Association 

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International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty–article–paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. In contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that reservations are not driven purely by state-level characteristics such as regime type or the nature of the legal system. Rather, it appears that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.

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(2021) "Stay the Hand of Justice? US Resistance to the International Criminal Court." In Boyer, Mark, A. and Cameron Thies (Editors). Forum: Did "America First" Construct America Irrelevant? International Studies Perspectives 22(4): 483–486.

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Author: Kelebogile Zvobgo

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• Read three related articles from April 2019, February 2021, and April 2021 in The Washington Post

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The United States, a key architect of global governance institutions in the twentieth century, has moderated its international engagement in the twenty-first century. In climate governance, the United States signed but did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, then acceded to but ultimately withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord. In trade, the United States entered but later abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And in human rights, the United States failed to join core treaties like the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The United States’ withdrawal from these and other international regimes sparks the question: Has “America First” made America irrelevant? I focus my answer to this question on the United States’ refusal to join the ICC, the apogee of the international criminal justice system that it helped build. I argue that, despite the efforts of antiglobalists and rule-of-law obstructionists like Donald Trump, the United States remains relevant to international criminal justice and may yet strengthen it, albeit unintentionally.

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(2024) "Social Pressure in the International Human Rights Regime: Why States Withdraw Treaty Reservations."

British Journal of Political Science 54(1): 241–259.

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Authors: Christina Boyes, Cody Eldredge, Megan Shannon, and Kelebogile Zvobgo 

 

States often use reservations to modify their treaty obligations. Prior research demonstrates why states enter reservations and why states object to reservations, but little work explains why states withdraw them. We argue that states withdraw reservations in response to international social pressure. Using novel data on reservations and reservation withdrawals for the nine core international human rights treaties, our analyses reveal two factors that compel states to withdraw reservations: (1) pressure from peer states and (2) pressure from human rights treaty bodies conducting periodic reviews. While previous work emphasize domestic factors, our research shows that the international community encourages states to withdraw reservations and strengthen their commitments to human rights and international law.

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(2024) "Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Matter for Ratification?"Journal of Human Rights 23(1): 1–18. *Lead Article*

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Authors: Suzie Mulesky, Wayne Sandholtz, and Kelebogile Zvobgo

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International relations scholarship assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of treaty ratification. In human rights, the worse a particular state’s record, the higher the presumptive costs of ratification and the lower the likelihood of ratification. But prior work neglects variation in the extent of obligation that different treaties create. In this article, we argue and demonstrate that (1) human rights treaties differ substantially in the scope and scale of the obligations they contain, (2) this variation can be measured, and (3) it matters for ratification. Treaties that create a larger number of demanding obligations imply greater potential costs of compliance for states. The larger the number of demanding obligations, the more grounds various actors will have to challenge a state’s practices. We analyze innovative data on treaty obligations and commitments for the ten core global human rights treaties to test our propositions, and we find strong support.

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"Complementarity and Public Views on Overlapping International and Domestic Courts"

Forthcoming in Journal of Politics

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Authors: Kelebogile Zvobgo and Stephen Chaudoin

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• Read four related articles from March 2020 and February 2021 in The Washington Post, November 2021 in Foreign Affairs, and December 2021 in Foreign Policy

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Can international organizations (IOs) boost support for their authority? We consider the effectiveness of appeals to the principle of complementarity, which holds that IOs only act when domestic institutions fail. Supporters of IOs like the International Criminal Court (ICC) frequently use complementarity as an argument to rally support for international action and spur domestic action. We evaluate the effectiveness of complementarity arguments using the largest survey experiment on the ICC to date, with more than 10,000 participants in five countries whose cooperation could be pivotal for the Court: Georgia, Israel, the Philippines, South Africa, and the United States. We find only modest evidence that complementarity arguments improve public support for either ICC investigations or domestic investigations – effects which vary across countries. This suggests that a major argument thought to legitimate IOs may not persuade global publics. Instead, an IO’s negative judgment of domestic actions may be perceived as paternalistic or, in Global South contexts, neocolonial.

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"Responding to Criticism: Non-Democratic States and Treaty Reservation Withdrawals"

Under review

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Authors: Kelebogile Zvobgo, Megan Shannon, Cody D. Eldredge, and Christina Boyes  

 

Recent research shows non-democracies, like their democratic counterparts, use reservations to adjust their treaty commitments. But non-democracies receive far greater pressure to withdraw reservations. To what extent is this pressure effective? Statistical analyses and case illustrations reveal non-democracies respond to international pressure differently than democracies: non-democracies are more likely to withdraw reservations when facing treaty body reviews but are less likely to withdraw reservations in response to objections from peer states. We explore possible explanations for this difference. Non-democracies may be more responsive to periodic reviews because they are conducted by technical experts from diverse countries, regions, and political regimes, rather than states' political representatives. Periodic review is also an iterative process that gives non-democracies time to address domestic opposition to withdrawing reservations. In contrast, non-democracies may be less likely to withdraw reservations in response to state objections because they see objections, which primarily originate with Western democracies, as biased, hypocritical, and possibly even neocolonial. Objections are also only filed once and may thus not enjoy sustained impact.

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“Structural Violence and International Law”

For the volume Handbook of Structural Violence. Joshua M. Price and Alexandra S. Moore (eds.)

In progress

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Authors: Francesca Parente and Kelebogile Zvobgo

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This chapter analyzes international human rights law and international criminal law – the areas of law that most closely intersect with structural violence. First, we discuss how treaties, courts, and remedies address structural violence. Some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, stipulate that states confront structural sources of gender-based discrimination and violence. Some courts and quasi-judicial bodies also address structural violence against indigenous peoples’ rights. In addition, while rare, some human rights courts order remedies intended to mitigate and prevent structural violence. Second, we turn to where treaties, courts, and remedies do not (but ought to) address structural violence. For example, the Apartheid Convention, unique in its focus on structural violence, has attracted few ratifications compared to other human rights treaties, and none from settler-colonial states such as Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the United States. The treaty’s monitoring mechanism is also defunct. Consequently, some of the states with the greatest culpability can evade accountability. While courts, for their part, can address causes of structural violence, most judgments are about the facts of a particular case and involve only the immediate victims and perpetrators, separated from the broader context in which the rights violations took place. Some remedies also fail to address root causes of violence and thus do not provide victims a guarantee of non-repetition. Finally, we turn to the ways treaties, courts, and remedies can actually further structural violence. For instance, the privileging of certain groups in international law under the definition of genocide, the uneven application of criminal accountability, and the ways that courts determine who counts as a victim – all of these perpetuate forms of structural violence in unintended, but no less harmful, ways. The chapter concludes with some suggestions for future research.

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"From Dialogue to Discord: Analyzing Aggressive Rhetoric's Impact on Support for the International Criminal Court"

In progress

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Authors: Richard T. Clark and Kelebogile Zvobgo

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Politicians increasingly use aggressive (i.e., forceful or belligerent) rhetoric to describe their countries' relationship with international organizations (IOs). We posit that aggressive cues promoting disengagement from IOs reduces support for these organizations among both public and elite audiences, especially among conservatives. We evaluate this proposition in the context of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has a mandate to help end impunity for serious international crimes like genocide. We conduct two survey experiments to test the effect of aggressive disengagement rhetoric on support for the ICC among policy elites and the mass public. We administer the first survey experiment to a diverse national sample of Americans and the second to a sample of policy elites, in partnership with the Teaching, Research & International Policy project at William & Mary. While aggressive disengagement rhetoric has increased over time in the media and among some elites, this rhetoric does not appear to be worsening attitudes towards the ICC.